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THEORY

OF THE

MOODS OF VERBS;

BY DR GREGORY.

FROM THE

TRANSACTIONS

OF THE

ROYAL SOCIETY OF EDINBURGH.

Ἡ τοῦ λόγου νοήσις ἡ τε φράσις τὰ πλείω δι' ἑκατέρου διέπτυκται.

LONGINUS.

THEORY *of the* MOODS *of* VERBS.

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[*Read by the Author, June* 18. *and July* 16. 1787.]

IN the proſecution of certain philological and philoſophical ſpeculations, very ample ſpecimens of which have already been ſubmitted to the conſideration of the Royal Society of Edinburgh, I had occaſion to conſider more minutely than I believe had ever been done before, many particulars relating to the nature, the ſtructure, and the import of Verbs.

THOSE ſpeculations related chiefly or ſolely to the general radical import of every verb and every claſs of verbs, without any regard to the peculiar meaning or nature of the various inflections or parts of a Verb; ſuch as, moods, tenſes, perſons and numbers. It was impoſſible, however, for me altogether to avoid attending to theſe modifications of the general meaning of every Verb; eſpecially to the nature and import of the Moods of verbs, which appears to me a very curious and intereſting point in the theory of language.

As I had not the good fortune to meet with any account of the Moods of verbs, which appeared to me complete or juſt, in the writings of thoſe grammarians and philologiſts that I have had an opportunity of conſulting, I was tempted to undertake the inveſtigation of the nature of them myſelf. The reſult of

that undertaking I now have the honour to ſubmit to the conſideration of the Royal Society.

As there is ſomething peculiar in the plan and manner of it, it is proper to mention the reaſon of this peculiarity. In thoſe accounts of the moods of verbs which I have ſeen, there ſeemed to be a want of ſufficiently numerous and extenſive and accurate obſervations of the particular facts that were to be explained or accounted for; a want of ſufficiently preciſe and diſtinct notions of the general import of the moods; a haſty and careleſs admiſſion of certain general principles not duly aſcertained, and a vague uſe of certain general and comprehenſive terms, which were not ſufficiently explained or underſtood.

In order to avoid theſe errors, and to ſupply theſe defects, I have proceeded on a plan more nearly akin to that which has long been ſucceſsfully employed in phyſical inveſtigations; beginning with a collection of obſervations relating to the moods of verbs; from theſe deducing certain general principles, and verifying theſe principles by further obſervation, and even experiment. Such a plan is undoubtedly laborious, and may appear tedious; but I think it has advantages amply ſufficient to compenſate theſe inconveniences.

I must mention likewiſe, that this Eſſay bears a particular and very intimate relation to the doctrine concerning the moods of verbs, laid down by the learned author of the treatiſe on the *Origin and Progreſs of Language*, (Vol. II.) with which I may preſume my hearers to be ſufficiently acquainted.

The account which he gives of the number, the nature, and the import of the moods of verbs, though very acute, and in many reſpects perfectly juſt, is certainly very incomplete, and in one important circumſtance it is very obſcure; which makes me ſuſpect, that, on this point, he had not carried his inveſtigation ſo far as to obtain a complete and diſtinct view of the ſubject which he was treating.

But

BUT though I make many remarks on his doctrine, and often refer to it, my Eſſay is by no means intended to cavil at it, but, on the contrary, to make uſe of it, as being, on the whole, the beſt diſquiſition on the ſubject that I have ſeen; to correct what is erroneous, and to ſupply what is wanting, in his treatiſe, and to carry the inveſtigation farther than he had done.

I AGREE perfectly with this learned author in thinking that the *infinitive* is moſt improperly called a *mood:* and I think the obſervation a very important one; for, on this account, it is to the *infinitive, excluſively,* that we ſhould turn our thoughts, when we endeavour to inveſtigate the general import of the Verb, with a view to aſcertain the *accident* which it denotes, and be led, ſtep by ſtep, to form a diſtinct notion of what is common in the *accidents* of all verbs, and of what is peculiar in the *accidents* of the ſeveral claſſes of them, and thereby be enabled to give good definitions, ſpecifying the eſſence of a Verb, and the characteriſtic import of the different claſſes of verbs, ſuch as ſubſtantive, neuter, active intranſitive, active tranſitive, paſſive, and reflected verbs. The infinitive, I own, does not expreſs the pure general meaning of the verb; for it comprehends likewiſe the circumſtances of time, and in ſome languages thoſe of perſon, and of courſe of number, and perhaps of gender. *Scribere. Scripſiſſe. Scripturum eſſe. Scripturas eſſe.*

BUT the infinitive (ſo far as I can perceive) denotes no *energy* or modification of thought (ſuch as, affirming, commanding, aſking or wiſhing) that is peculiar to itſelf, as the other moods do; but only that kind of thought, or combination of thoughts, which is common to all the others. Now, ſome peculiarity of that kind I take to be the very eſſence of a mood.

YET the thought expreſſed by the infinitive is clearly apprehended, and plainly ſhews that the word denoting it is a verb.

Non eſt VIVERE *ſed* VALERE *vita.*

Sæpe etiam ſteriles INCENDERE *profuit agros,*
Atque levem ſtipulam crepitantibus URERE *flammis.*

——*Pudet hæc opprobria nobis*
Et DICI POTUISSE, *et non* POTUISSE REFELLI.

READING (ſays BACON) makes a full man, *ſpeaking* a ready man, and *writing* an exact man.

(THESE Engliſh words in *ing*, will be called participles, or perhaps verbal nouns; they have the form of *participles* and verbal nouns, but the meaning of infinitives; and may be tranſlated into Greek and Latin by infinitives. But it is of no conſequence whether they be called *participles* or *infinitives;* the meaning of them is obvious, and is the ſame with that of the Latin *infinitives.*)

THE meaning or thoughts expreſſed by theſe infinitives, are as plainly characteriſtic of verbs as thoſe denoted by *Vivo ſed non valeo. Incendite ſteriles agros—urite levem ſtipulam. Opprobria dicuntur nobis.* Yet in the latter there is *mood*, while in the former there is not. Whence it follows that *mood*, properly ſo called, is not eſſential to a verb. It is only the capacity or ſuſceptibility of *mood*, that can with propriety be ſaid to be eſſential to a verb. This diſtinction, which I think of ſome importance, may be ſufficiently explained and illuſtrated by the following examples. It is not diviſion, but diviſibility, that is eſſential to a geometrical line; it is not fluidity, but fuſibility, that is eſſential to lead; not motion, but mobility, nor reſt, but the capacity of being at reſt, that is eſſential to body. But *reſt* is eſſential to ſpace, and, for aught I know, *motion* may be ſo to light.

I SUSPECT therefore ſome inaccuracy in the learned author's manner of expreſſing himſelf, when he ſays in one page, (161) that moods are eſſential to verbs, and in the next page remarks that the infinitive is not a mood. This would imply, that a verb, when put in the infinitive, ceaſed to be a verb; which he does not expreſsly ſay, though he comes very near to it, in the following words: "As to the infinitive, I hold it to be no "mood, though it be commonly called ſo; becauſe it expreſſes "no energy of the mind of the ſpeaker, but ſimply the action" (he ſhould certainly have ſaid more generally the *accident*, as in *eſſe*, *valere*, or *cadere*) "of the verb, with the addition of time. "It is therefore uſed, either as a noun, or it ſerves to connect "the verb with another verb, or a noun, and ſo is uſeful in "ſyntax." But ſtill I would aſk, When it is uſed in theſe or other ways, and is accordingly uſeful in ſyntax, does it *bona fide* ceaſe to be a verb? I own I do not think it does; for this reaſon, that the thought expreſſed by means of the *infinitive*, may be expreſſed in ſynonymous and convertible phraſes, in different languages, by means of other parts or moods of the verb. "*To be* or *not to be*, that is the queſtion," is equivalent in meaning, though ſuperior in ſimplicity, beauty and force of expreſſion, to "The queſtion is, whether we ſhall be or ſhall "not be."

——*Nec quicquam tibi prodeſt*
Aerias TENTASSE *domos, animoque rotundum*
PERCURRISSE *polum, morituro.*

Nec quicquam tibi prodeſt quod aerias domos TENTAVERIS, *et animo* PERCURRERIS *polum.*

MOREOVER, it muſt be taken into conſideration, that the infinitive not only appears as the *nomen verbi*, (which ſome have called it) but expreſſes fully the *accident* of the verb, whether this be mere exiſtence, or ſtate, or event, or intranſitive action, or tranſitive action, that is, action with relation of vari-

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ous kinds; and of courſe it has the proper *regimen* of the verb, when it expreſſes *action* and *relation*, or, in grammatical language, is tranſitive; as in *percurriſſe*, *tentaſſe*, *urere*, *incendere*, in the preceding examples.

Dico, *credo*, *puto*, *Titium exiſtere*, *valere*, *jacere*, *cecidiſſe*, *procubuiſſe*, *projeciſſe Mævium*, *projectum fuiſſe a Mævio*, have the very ſame meaning with *Dico*, &c. *quod Titius exiſtat*, *quod jaceat*, *quod ceciderit*, *procubuerit*, *projecerit Mævium*, *projectus fuerit a Mævio*.

I CANNOT help thinking, that, in theſe caſes, the infinitives, as well as the ſubjunctives, are truly verbs, though ſtripped of that circumſtance which is, in ſtrict propriety of language, called *mood*. Nor do the *infinitives* as thus uſed acquire any further meaning, in addition to the radical import of the verb with tenſe, like the proper moods; but the *ſubjunctives* after *quod* loſe their peculiar meaning as *moods*, and ſignify no more than bare *infinitives*.

I THINK ſome more illuſtration may be given to this ſubject, by conſidering the import of participles, which partake of the nature both of verbs and of adjectives; and that of verbal nouns, which partake of the nature and meaning of verbs and of ſubſtantive nouns.

IT is an acknowledged fact with reſpect to participles, and it is equally true with reſpect to verbal nouns, that, by means of them, various thoughts, commonly expreſſed by the moods of verbs, or by the infinitives of them, may be expreſſed with great accuracy, and ſometimes with advantage in compoſition, by enabling us to leſſen the number of verbs in a ſentence, or to vary occaſionally the ſtructure of it. *Nec quicquam tibi prodeſt morituro tua* TENTATIO *domuum aeriarum, et* CURSUS *tuus circa polum*, though a very crabbed inelegant ſentence, has the very ſame meaning with HORACE's beautiful lines, and with the proſe verſion immediately ſubjoined to it.

WHY are not *tentatio* and *curſus* reckoned verbs, as well as *tentaſſe* and *percurriſſe*? They are ſurely very near akin.

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THE anſwer given to this queſtion by the author of the Eſſay on the *Origin and Progreſs of Language*, and which he ſays is plain, I muſt own appears to me very obſcure and unſatisfactory. Nor can I think that the defect is entirely in me, and that I ought to underſtand it; for I can ſpecify what is wanting to the anſwer which he gives, in order to make it plain and ſatisfactory. His anſwer is,

" THAT it (to wit a verbal noun, like *curſus* or *tentatio*) ex-
" preſſes no energy of the mind of the ſpeaker, who pronounces
" the words; nor does it affirm that the thing exiſts or does not
" exiſt; nor does it command that it ſhould or ſhould not exiſt;
" nor does it wiſh that it may or may not exiſt; but ſimply gives
" us the conception of the mind of the ſpeaker." *Page* 167.

BEFORE we can fully underſtand this anſwer, (which ſeems to apply to *infinitives* as well as to *verbal nouns*), or of courſe judge whether it be juſt and complete, or not, we muſt know what the author means by *energy*, and what by *conception*, what more or leſs he apprehends there is in the one than in the other, or how he diſtinguiſhes them. Nor can this be known but by finding what there is in common among all the *energies*, (for ſomething common among them, even as conceived by him, it is demonſtrable there *muſt be*) and not belonging to any ſimple *conceptions*. We have *energy* expreſſed, and of courſe a verb conſtituted, even according to his definition of a verb, without affirmation, when we wiſh or command; without command, when we affirm or wiſh; without wiſh, when we command or affirm: Yet in all theſe caſes we have equally and indiſputably a verb. How ſhall we know what is in common to them all? How much of the meaning of a verb is in a verbal noun? What is wanting, beſides the ſuſceptibility of *mood*? Whence does this ſuſceptibility of mood ariſe, or wherein does it conſiſt? Does it depend on the combination of the notion of time with that of the proper *accident* of a verb, which combination takes place in the infinitive, and even remains in the participles of a verb, but not in a verbal noun?

Exiſtentia

Exiſtentia (whether good Latin or not) is the predicament or *accident* of *being*.

Vita is the ſtate or *accident* of *living*. *Caſus*, *obitus*, the events or *accidents* of *falling* and of *dying*.

Cogitatio, *lectio*, *ſcriptio*, *curſus*, *ædificatio*, *trucidatio*, are the *accidents* or actions of thinking, reading, writing, running, building and murdering.

In Engliſh, almoſt any noun ſubſtantive may occaſionally be converted into a verb, by uſing it to denote thoſe thoughts, or combinations of thoughts, ſuch as exiſtence, ſtate, event, activity, intranſitive, or tranſitive, or reflected, and paſſiveneſs or being the object or ſubject of activity, which are conceived to conſtitute the eſſence of a verb.

Water is plainly a noun.

Watered a participle.

To water a verb, without *mood*.

He watereth, *water thou*, *may it be watered*, *it was watered*, a verb with *mood*.

A watering, a verbal noun, retaining the accident, but not the import of *mood;* and nearly allied to the infinitive *to water*, in every reſpect but that it does not involve the notion of time, as the infinitives *to water*, *to have watered*, *&c.* plainly do.

These are but hints. *Valeant quantum valere poſſint.*

I suspect that the author whoſe doctrine I am conſidering, has been raſh in limiting the number of *moods* to three; the *indicative*, expreſſing affirmation, (and of courſe negation) under which he comprehends the *ſubjunctive*, as being nearly of the ſame import, and denoting affirmation, only qualified or conditional; the *optative*, expreſſing wiſhing or praying; and the *imperative*, expreſſing command.

I should think the ſame kind of reaſo that he urges againſt admitting an *interrogative* mood, namely, that " it is " not expreſſed by any different form of the verb, but only " by particles, or by a certain arrangement of the words,"

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and for rejecting the *potential* mood, and for making the *ſubjunctive* only a branch of the *indicative*, would apply with equal force againſt admitting an *optative* mood, at leaſt in ſome languages, as for inſtance in our own.

In the following lines,

Te SPECTEM *ſuprema mihi cum venerit hora;*
Te TENEAM *moriens deficiente manu.*

The verbs *ſpectem* and *teneam* expreſs very clearly the *energy* of wiſhing. This modification of thought is denoted in Latin by inflection, and would be ſo in Greek, σε θεῴμην, σε κατεχοιμι, and will be allowed to conſtitute a perfect mood. But in Engliſh it muſt be denoted by a certain arrangement of the words, and therefore ſhould be no mood, any more than interrogation. "Thee "may I look on when my laſt hour ſhall come; thee may I "graſp, when dying, in my failing hand." *I may look on thee, I may graſp thee*, have meanings as different from thoſe denoted by the ſame words differently arranged, as *Cæſar was killed*, is from *was Cæſar killed?*

If I am rightly informed, the Chineſe language has no *imperative mood;* and thoſe who ſpeak it are obliged to employ a very clumſy circumlocution, by means of a verb ſignifying *command*, to expreſs the familiar meaning of our imperative.

It does not appear clearly to me, that the *ſubjunctive* mood expreſſes merely qualified or conditional affirmation in every caſe, though undoubtedly it does ſo in many caſes. In the following lines of HORACE,

Ulla ſi juris tibi pejerati
Pœna, BARINE, NOCUISSET *unquam;*
Dente ſi nigro FIERES, *vel uno*
Turpior ungui,
CREDEREM.

The word *crederem* to be ſure denotes merely a qualified or conditional affirmation: I might, could, would, or ſhould believe, if a certain event took place. But the verbs expreſſing this condition and ſuppoſition, are alſo in the *ſubjunctive*, *nocuiſſet*, *fieres*, after the particle *ſi*. With this particle, they might have been put in the *indicative*, and the ſenſe would ſtill have been complete, *nocuerat*, *fiebas*. The ſame thought may be expreſſed accurately in Engliſh, without the uſe of any particle correſponding to *ſi*, and merely by the peculiar arrangement of the words, juſt as was done with the wiſh of TIBULLUS, "Had "any puniſhment ever overtaken you for your broken vows; "were but one of your teeth growing black, or even were but "one of your nails becoming leſs beautiful, I ſhould believe "you."

I CANNOT conceive that the three firſt verbs in this ſentence denote any affirmation at all, conditional or unconditional, but a very plain ſuppoſition. And this thought ſeems to me to be as well entitled to be called an *energy*, as TIBULLUS's wiſh; and when it is expreſſed (no matter in what way, whether by inflection, by augment, or by peculiar arrangement) by a verb, it muſt be either a perfect grammatical mood, or ſomething very near akin to one.

THE very ſame kind of thought, to wit ſuppoſition, is expreſſed by *circumlocution*, and a kind of *metaphor*, in the following lines.

> PONE *me, pigris ubi nulla campis*
> *Arbor æſtiva recreatur aura:*
> PONE *ſub curru nimium propinqui*
> *Solis, in terra domibus negata.*

IN which *pone*, though in the *imperative* mood, expreſſes no command, but only ſuppoſition or condition. This *Captain Macheath* and *Polly Peachum* (or Mr GAY for them) underſtood perfectly;

perfectly; and accordingly tranſlate the thought very well, without either an *imperative* or a *particle*, by *arrangement*.

Were I laid on Greenland's coaſt,
Were I ſold on India's ſoil.

It may be remarked too, that HORACE expreſſes his qualified or conditional affirmation, which is ſubjoined to the ſuppoſition by a verb in the indicative, not in the ſubjunctive mood.

Dulce ridentem LALAGEN AMABO.

Macbeath takes the common *ſubjunctive*:

Too ſoon the half year's night WOULD *paſs;*

And *Polly*, the *potential*,

I COULD *mock the ſultry toil.*

—— *Omnia novit*
Græculus eſuriens; in cœlum, JUSSERIS, IBIT.

A little hungry Greek knows every thing; he will go to heaven, *ſhould you deſire him.* This is *conditional affirmation*, expreſſed by the *indicative*, and *ſuppoſition* by the *ſubjunctive* mood.

Illum et parentis CREDIDERIM *ſui*
Fregiſſe cervicem.

I *could believe* that he had murdered his father. This I conceive to be an inſtance of the *potential mood;* if not of the verb *credo*, at leaſt of human thought.

WHATEVER may be thought of the preceding obſervations, it muſt at leaſt be admitted, that the moods of verbs may be conſidered in two very different points of view; either *with relation to any particular language*, or *with relation to human thought*, which muſt be ſuppoſed the ſame in all ages and nations. For the ſake of diſtinctneſs, I ſhall call the expreſſions of them, by inflection or otherwiſe in language, *grammatical moods;* and the thoughts, or combinations of thoughts, ſo expreſſed, as well as ſimilar combinations of thoughts, though not always, or perhaps never expreſſed in the ſame way, I ſhall call *energies*, or *modifications*, or *moods of thought*.

WITH reſpect to the former of theſe things in any particular language, there can be no diſpute or difficulty. Any tolerably good grammar of that language will ſhew at once the number and the forms of them in it; and the exact import of each of them, and the proper application of them all, will ſoon be learned by attending to the uſe of thoſe who ſpeak and write that language well. But the latter (the moods of thought) muſt be inveſtigated in a different and much more laborious way; by ſtrict attention to our own thoughts, and with ſuch aid as the ſtructure of language, and obſervation, and even experiment afford.

ALL languages, I believe, are very defective in reſpect of that variety and accuracy of combination and of diſtinction, which we know with infallible certainty take place in thought. Nor do I know of any particular in which language is more deficient, than in the expreſſing of thoſe *energies* or modifications of thought, ſome of which always are, and all of which might be expreſſed by the grammatical moods of verbs. Of this, there cannot be a clearer proof, than the well known facts, that we are obliged to expreſs by the ſame mood very different modifications or *energies* of thought, and that the number of moods, as marked by inflection or otherwiſe, is different in different languages, which, of courſe, do not correſpond ſo far

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as to admit of perfect and literal tranſlation in all caſes from one to another, or at leaſt not without circumlocution.

YET, unfavourable as this circumſtance muſt, at firſt ſight, appear to the hopes of one who wiſhes to inveſtigate the nature of the moods of verbs, and ultimately to aſcertain the nature of a verb itſelf, I think it is chiefly by attending to it, by conſidering what modifications of thought are expreſſed by grammatical *moods* in different languages, and by comparing them with ſuch modifications of thought as are never, or at leaſt not uſually, expreſſed in that way, and by examining how it comes to paſs that ſome of them are, while others are not ſo expreſſed, that we ſhall be led to diſcover wherein they agree or differ, that is, to learn the common nature of all, and the particular nature of each of them, which is the immediate object of enquiry.

THE province of the ſchoolmaſter who undertakes to teach any particular language, Engliſh, French, Latin, or Greek, extends no farther than to explain the meaning and ſhew the uſe of the grammatical moods which are found in that language which he teaches; and his ſcholars, at leaſt at an early period of life, can go no farther.

BUT the province of the philologiſt, who wiſhes to examine the ſtructure of language, and of the philoſopher, who wiſhes to inveſtigate the laws of human thought, is much more extenſive. Every grammatical *mood* that is found in any one language, is to him a proof of a correſponding diſtinction, or variety of *energy*, or modification of thought; for all men are by nature capable of learning any language. Nor does he ſtop here. From conſidering how many *energies* are expreſſed by grammatical *moods*, he is led to form a more extenſive and juſt notion of thoſe *energies*, and may naturally ſuſpect, and with a little attention will ſoon diſcover, that there are many other ſimilar *energies*, which are not expreſſed in any language; and to theſe, as well as to thoſe that are expreſſed, in ſome or

all

all languages, by grammatical moods, he ought unqueſtionably to direct his attention.

It is evident at firſt ſight, that a variety of thoughts, or modifications of thought, may be combined, or conceived and expreſſed, along with the general meaning or *accident* denoted by any verb.

It is equally evident, that only a few of theſe modifications of thought are expreſſed by grammatical moods in Greek, Latin or in the modern European languages.

It is alſo evident, that in theſe languages, one grammatical mood is often employed to denote very different modifications of, or additions to, the thought, or combination of thoughts, which is expreſſed equally by every part of the verb, and which may be found without *mood*, though not without *tenſe*, in the *infinitive*.

And it is plain alſo, that both thoſe additions and modifications of thought, which commonly are, and thoſe which are not expreſſed by the grammatical moods of any verb, may be expreſſed by the infinitive of that verb, with the addition and *regimen* (that is, *marked relation*) of another verb. And this additional or auxiliary verb muſt be in the firſt perſon, either ſingular or plural, of the preſent tenſe of the indicative mood. In ſome caſes, there may be more than one ſtep in this proceſs of reſolution, as in interrogation; but it always terminates ultimately in a verb in the preſent of the indicative, and in the *firſt perſon*, as the phraſe to be reſolved is the expreſſion of the thought of the perſon or perſons ſpeaking.

Affirming, denying, teſtifying, foretelling or prophecying, aſking, anſwering, wiſhing, hoping, expecting, believing, knowing, doubting, ſuppoſing, ſtipulating, being able, commanding, praying, requeſting, ſupplicating, loving, hating, fearing, deſpairing, being accuſtomed, wondering, admiring, warning, ſwearing, adviſing, refuſing, exhorting, diſſuading, encouraging, promiſing, threatening, and perhaps numberleſs other modifi-

cations

cations of thought, for which I cannot eaſily find names, all admit very readily of being combined with the general import of a verb, and form with it various more complicated meanings, which are eaſily diſtinguiſhable from one another, and are not convertible, and therefore muſt be different. There are various degrees and kinds of reſemblance or affinity among them, in conſequence of which they admit of being arranged, and of courſe of having different more general names given with propriety to the ſeveral diviſions or claſſes of them. And there is ſomething common among them all, to which the name of *energy*, without any impropriety (that I can ſee), may be applied. If every one of them had been expreſſed in all languages, by variations as ſtriking as thoſe of τυπτω, τυπτοιμι, and τυπτε, they *muſt* have been acknowledged as diſtinct *moods* of the verb. They are equally *moods* or *diſtinct energies* of thought, whether expreſſed in language or not, if they be but underſtood by thoſe who uſe language; as for inſtance, in the caſe of the grammatical mood called the *imperative*, by which we expreſs occaſionally prayer to GOD, command to a ſlave, requeſt to a ſuperior, advice to an equal or to any one, order as from an officer to his ſubaltern, ſupplication to one whom we cannot reſiſt. Theſe *ſpecific* differences of thought were perhaps in ſome meaſure expreſſed in Greek by the *tenſes* of the imperative, the exact uſes and import of which I muſt own I underſtand but very imperfectly.

IF they could all be arranged under three heads, as the author of the *Origin and Progreſs of Language* conceives, affirming, wiſhing and commanding; or if they could all be referred to one head, affirmation, as many philologiſts think they may, this would be but a ſmall addition to our knowledge concerning them, compared to what we might expect to obtain by a more accurate examination of them; and it muſt be acknowledged to be ſomewhat raſh to attempt to arrange them, without firſt examining them carefully.

THE

THE caſe of the *moods* of verbs is exactly parallel to that of their *tenſes*, which is very accurately pointed out and happily illuſtrated by the learned author of the treatiſe on the *Origin and Progreſs of Language*.

ALMOST every language has its own advantages and diſadvantages in the expreſſing of the various diviſions and relations of time; but the conception of theſe diviſions and relations of time muſt be the ſame in all mankind. So it is with the conception and the expreſſion of *moods* or *energies*, and indeed with the conception of every thing elſe which can be expreſſed by verbs, or by any other words. As in one of his own inſtances: "The "LORD *gave*, and the LORD *hath taken away;* bleſſed be the "name of the LORD." There is a preciſion and a beauty in this uſe of the ſimple contraſted with the compound paſt tenſe, which cannot be attained in Latin. *Dominus* DEDIT, *et Dominus* ABSTULIT; *benedictum ſit nomen Domini.* But it might be attained in Greek, by uſing the aoriſt for *gave*, and the preterperfect for *hath taken away*. On looking into the Septuagint, I do not, however, find that this delicacy of expreſſion has been attempted. But the genius of the Greek language has led the tranſlators to another nicety and propriety of expreſſion, which cannot be attained in any other language, nor indeed explained without a circumlocution: Ὁ Κυριος ἐδωκεν, ὁ Κυριος ἀφειλατο· ἐιη το ὀνομα Κυριου ἐυλογημενον. In this paſſage, ἐδωκεν is the aoriſt of the active voice of the verb ſignifying *to give;* ἀφειλατο is the aoriſt of the middle voice of the verb ſignifying *to take away*. The Greek ſentence therefore expreſſes, The LORD gave, the LORD took away *to himſelf*, took back to himſelf, or ſimply *took back*. *Dominus* DEDIT, *Dominus* RECEPIT. If the Greek verb ἀφαιρεω had a preterperfect middle, and if this tenſe of the middle voice had, like moſt other parts of the middle verb, a kind of reciprocal or reflected meaning, on which points I dare not preſume to decide, but muſt leave them to the judgment of grammarians, it would be poſſible to expreſs in Greek both the

the niceties in queſtion. Yet it cannot be doubted, that all mankind are capable of underſtanding them perfectly, whether they uſe a language in which they can be expreſſed by mere inflections or not.

By means of the ſame *tenſe* and the ſame *mood*, to wit, the future of the indicative, we are accuſtomed to expreſs either mere futurity, and of courſe a prophecy, or an intention or purpoſe, or a threat, or a promiſe.

—— *Improviſa Lethi*
Vis rapuit RAPIETQUE *gentes.* HOR.

Quo nos cunque FERET *melior fortuna parente,*
IBIMUS *O ſocii comiteſque.* HOR.

Cras ingens ITERABIMUS *æquor.* HOR.

Ille Deûm vitam ACCIPIET, *Diviſque* VIDEBIT
Permiſtos Heroas, et ipſe VIDEBITUR *illis :*
Pacatumque REGET *patriis virtutibus orbem.* VIRG.

Verberibus cæſum te in piſtrinum Dave DEDAM *uſque ad necem.*
TER.

Quarum, quæ forma pulcherrima, Deiopeiam
Connubio JUNGAM *ſtabili, propriamque* DICABO. VIRG.

In the two firſt of theſe inſtances from HORACE, we have, I think, the bare expreſſion of what is to come to paſs.

In the third and fourth, we have not only futurity, but intention or purpoſe, plainly expreſſed.

The prophecies in the four inſtances, from VIRGIL's *Pollio*, are, I apprehend, ſomething more than what is expreſſed or underſtood in the two firſt of the preceding examples, and dif-

ferent from what is expreſſed in the two laſt of them. The future events mentioned ſeem to be announced with authority, or ſomething like ſupernatural knowledge or information, which I take to be eſſential to the notion of prophecy.

But *Juno*'s promiſe of a handſome wife to *Æolus*, and *Simo's* threatening of a ſevere whipping and perpetual impriſonment and hard labour to *Davus*, are by no means mere predictions of ſuch good or evil to them, nor yet bare enunciations of the intentions of the ſpeakers to them, but ſomething very different; other *energies*, modifications of thought, or moods, in ſo far at leaſt as mood is predicable of thought, which I think it is completely. For if there were two or ten different forms or inflections of a verb in any language, or in all languages, to expreſs any one *mood* of thought, for inſtance affirmation, wiſh, or command, they would not be different *moods*, but only different forms of the ſame *mood*. This is not altogether an imaginary caſe. In Engliſh we have, at leaſt in ſome parts of our verbs, two forms or grammatical moods for one mood of thought; one of them ſimple, and only marked by inflection of the primary verb; the other compound, conſiſting of an auxiliary in addition to the primary verb; and in this caſe the inflection is in the auxiliary verb alone. *I write. I do write. They wrote. They did write.* (*They did wrote* or *they do wrote*, would be ſoleciſms.) *Write thou. Do thou write.* Every perſon, I think, muſt acknowledge, that theſe are not inſtances of two indicative and of two imperative moods in Engliſh, but only two forms or expreſſions of one indicative and of one imperative mood. If ſo, then it follows that *mood* is generally conceived to be properly an attribute or predicate of thought alone, while only the expreſſion of it, by inflection or otherwiſe, belongs to grammatical verbs, juſt as the firſt and ſecond future, or the firſt and ſecond aoriſt, of the regular Greek verbs, are not two futures and two paſt tenſes, but only two different forms or expreſſions of one future and of one paſt tenſe,

which

which tenſes are uniformly underſtood by all mankind. While the preſent, the imperfect, the aoriſt, the perfect, the pluſquam-perfect, and the future, are really different *tenſes*, or expreſſions of different notions of the relation of the general import of the verb to time; which expreſſions and notions are by no means convertible, and certainly may be underſtood by all mankind, though they are not found diſtinguiſhed in all languages. In ſhort, we muſt draw no inference with reſpect to the nature, the number, the affinities, or the arrangements of the moods of verbs, from the inflections or other variations employed in language, without taking into conſideration alſo the relation which thoſe inflections bear to human thought.

I HAVE further to add to theſe remarks on the import of the *moods* of verbs, that ſuch is the affinity or mutual relation among them, that they may often, by circumlocution, and the introduction of an additional verb, and ſometimes without any ſuch addition to the principal verb, and merely by a kind of metaphor, be interchanged, or ſubſtituted one for another, without materially affecting the ſenſe of the paſſages wherein they occur, and ſometimes with the manifeſt effect of giving a more full and particular expoſition of the meaning of ſuch paſſages. This I mention, not for the ſake of any advantage that can in general be obtained by ſuch interchange, or ſubſtitution, but that I may point out that it is not properly a reſolution or decompoſition of the meaning of the ſeveral moods, as ſome philologiſts have ſuppoſed, and have thought an important diſcovery in grammar, but a mere circumlocution, and a kind of paraphraſe of the ſhorter and more common expreſſion, and ſometimes a mere metaphor, inſtead of a literal expreſſion of thought. That it can be no reſolution of a more complicated into ſeveral ſimpler meanings, appears plainly from this conſideration, that it is *mutual* among the moods; the ſuppoſed ſimpler being as eaſily reſolvable into the ſuppoſed complicated, as theſe are into them. But of this afterwards. In general,

the expreſſion by the common, or what we may call the natural mood, is as clear and intelligible as the circumlocution, or ſuppoſed reſolution of it, and much ſhorter, and more animated and forcible, and of courſe more agreeable and proper.

It muſt be owned, however, that ſometimes there is a great and manifeſt beauty and advantage, not only in point of variety, but in force and animation of expreſſion, obtained by uſing a mood of the verb, and a form of ſpeech different from what might be termed the natural one, and what would expreſs the literal meaning of the ſpeaker. Thus, in the ode of Horace, already quoted, the uſe of the *imperative mood* inſtead of the *ſubjunctive*, which would expreſs the literal meaning, appears to me advantageous, even putting all regard to verſe out of the queſtion. Pone *me pigris*, &c. Pone *ſub curru*, &c. is ſurely more forcible and animated than *Si ponerer*, or *Si eſſem poſitus*, or ſimply *poſitus*, though the general meaning be the ſame. And Gay's lines, in imitation of theſe two ſtanzas of Horace,

Were I laid on Greenland's coaſt,
Were I ſold on India's ſoil,

though highly beautiful, and in one reſpect, I mean the boldneſs of the imagery introduced, ſuperior both to Horace's own lines, and to thoſe of his tranſlator, are leſs animated than either the original or the tranſlation,

Place me *where never ſummer breeze*
Unbinds the earth or fans the trees;
Place me *beneath the burning ray,*
Where rolls the rapid car of day.

All ſuch applications of the imperative mood I conſider as metaphorical; underſtanding by the term metaphor, the *transferring*

ferring of any word or phraſe, and employing it to expreſs a thought different from what it denotes in its original, ſtrict, and literal ſignification; which I take to be the very eſſence and proper definition of this figure of ſpeech.

In like manner, the *interrogative mood*, inſtead of the *conditional* or *ſubjunctive*, which would fully and clearly have expreſſed the literal meaning of the poet, gives peculiar animation and ſpirit to the following lines:

Fervet avaritia miſeroque cupidine pectus?
Laudis amore tumes?

Are you a covetous wretch? Are you a coxcomb?—If you are a miſer, If you are a coxcomb, would ſurely be flat.

And, on the ſame principle, ſuch expreſſions as the following, *Shall we receive good at the hand of* God, *and ſhall we not alſo receive evil?—Shall I do this great evil, and ſin againſt* God? are more animated and forcible than the plain literal expreſſions of the ſame thoughts would be.

It is more remarkable, that ſometimes a kind of beauty and force, not indeed from greater animation, for ſimple command and interrogation, as expreſſed by the imperative and interrogative moods, are, I believe, the moſt animated enunciations of thought, but from greater ſolemnity, may be given by employing the *indicative mood*, where either the *imperative* or the *interrogative* would fully have expreſſed the ſpeaker's meaning.

Lydia DIC *per omneis*
Te deos ORO, *Sybarin cur* PROPERES *amando*
Perdere: cur, &c.

Then follow all the articles of interrogation. The general meaning would have been completely expreſſed without the *imperative* DIC, and the *indicative* ORO; yet I preſume no perſon of

of taſte and judgment will diſpute, that, independently of the verſification, there is a beauty and force in HORACE's expreſſion far beyond what there would be in the ſimple interrogation, *Lydia cur Sybarin properas amando perdere?*

THE future of the *indicative* is employed in ſome caſes wherein the *imperative* mood would expreſs the literal meaning of the ſpeaker; as for inſtance, in the Decalogue, the expreſſions, *Thou ſhalt not kill*, *Thou ſhalt not ſteal*, *Thou ſhalt not commit adultery*, have not the proper future meaning, but are the moſt abſolute commands, or rather prohibitions, much more forcible, becauſe more ſolemn, than *Kill not*, *Steal not*, &c.

THE preceding obſervations on the nature and import of the moods of verbs, are ſo imperfect and ſo deſultory, that it may appear very raſh to draw any formal inferences from them. I hope, however, they are ſo far at leaſt intelligible and juſt, that the concluſions which I have in view, and which I think might be fairly deduced from a more ample and more methodical collection of ſimilar obſervations, will neither appear abſurd nor paradoxical.

THEY are chiefly the following.

I. THAT the *energies*, or modifications of thought, expreſſed by the moods of verbs, are ſuch as may be expreſſed ſeparately by other verbs, and *chiefly* by *active* verbs; or, in the phraſeology of the author of the eſſay on the *Origin and Progreſs of Language*, That the *energies* of the mind of the ſpeaker, denoted by the moods of verbs, are truly *accidents*, and chiefly *actions*.

THIS perhaps the learned author was not fully aware of, elſe he would not have uſed, in his definition of a verb, a phraſe which may be fairly tranſlated, " A verb is a word chiefly ſig-" nificant of being and of action, of the action of the mind " of the ſpeaker relative to that action," *&c.* Or, if he had been aware of this, he muſt, I think, have been led to examine more

more accurately the nature of the energies, actions, or accidents denoted by the moods of verbs.

YET, from his uniformly employing the term *energy* to denote the general import of all moods, we may preſume, that he had ſome conception of that intimate relation between the import of the accidents of ſome and that of the moods of all verbs. For he muſt have known, that *energy*, though a compound Greek word, and *action*, though a ſimple Latin word, when applied to the operations of mind, are perfectly ſynonymous; and he very properly mentions *action* as one of the chief *accidents* denoted by verbs.

HIS definition might even be fairly ſtated thus. "A verb "is a word chiefly ſignificant of accident, of the accident of "the mind of the ſpeaker relative to that accident," *&c.* For this is only ſubſtituting the *generic* term *accident* for the *ſpecific* term *energy* or *action;* ſo that the propoſition, though leſs particular and accurate, would ſtill be true.

II. THAT the *energies* expreſſed by the moods of verbs are *chiefly* the *ſocial* operations of mind, as they have been very properly termed by Dr REID; that is to ſay, ſuch as imply the belief of ſome other intelligent being to whom they relate, and which cannot be ſuppoſed to take place in a ſolitary being.

III. THAT the grammatical moods of verbs are conciſe modes of expreſſing ſome of thoſe combinations of thoughts, which occur moſt frequently, and are moſt important and ſtriking.

IV. THAT the number of grammatical moods is limited by the ſame circumſtances which ſeem to limit the variety, preciſion, and perfection of language, in other reſpects; and particularly by the convenience of thoſe who uſe it, and who in general will have no more moods to their verbs, and no more words or inflections of any kind, than they have abſolute occaſion

caſion for; and, of courſe, muſt often employ one mood as they do one word, or one inflection, in various ſenſes, that is, to expreſs occaſionally different thoughts.

V. THAT grammatical moods contribute greatly to the beauty and perfection of language, by the brevity, animation, and force, which they give to the expreſſion of our moſt familiar and intereſting combinations of thoughts, which may indeed be expreſſed, in ſome meaſure, by circumlocution, and the uſe of additional verbs, but not with the ſame advantages.

VI. THAT grammatical moods of verbs, like other inflections of words, expreſs much better than any ſucceſſion of words can do, the intimate connection and relation of various thoughts, which are not ſucceſſive, but ſimultaneous or coexiſtent, and which appear unnaturally disjointed, and in ſome meaſure altered, when they are expreſſed by a ſeries of words denoting each of them ſeparately and in ſucceſſion.

SOME of theſe concluſions, eſpecially the third, the fifth and the ſixth, are ſo intimately connected, that it is difficult to conſider them ſeparately; and as it is of no conſequence to keep them quite diſtinct in the following illuſtrations, I ſhall conſider them pretty much together, as I conceive they tend to explain and illuſtrate one another.

I. THE firſt of thoſe concluſions can hardly be thought a novelty, if it be conſidered that ſeveral philologiſts have maintained, that ſome of the moods are *reſolvable* into ſuch circuitous expreſſions, by means of other additional verbs. In truth, they are all, in ſome meaſure, *convertible*, though, in ſtrict propriety of language, not *reſolvable*, nor even *perfectly* convertible, in that way.

THE *indicative*, which denotes affirmation, is nearly the ſame in meaning, and of courſe is nearly convertible, with a verb

of

of affirming in the *firſt perſon* (either ſingular or plural) of the *preſent* of the *indicative*, and the general import of the primary verb, without mood, that is, in the infinitive. *Titius ſcribit, dico, dicimus, Titium ſcribere, quod Titius ſcribat. I ſay, we ſay, that he writes.* This kind of expreſſion is a mere pleonaſm. But ſomething very nearly approaching to it is often uſed in very ſolemn language, as in that of the Holy Scripture, and with a good effect. *Verily I ſay unto thee*, &c.

THE *imperative mood* is in ſome meaſure convertible with a verb of commanding, ſuch as *Jubeo*, in the firſt perſon of the preſent of the indicative, and the primary verb without mood.

I nunc, et verſus tecum meditare canoros.
Jubeo te nunc ire et tecum meditari, &c.
Jubeo, dico me jubere.

IN like manner, the *optative mood* is, in ſome meaſure, reſolvable or convertible by means of the primary verb without mood, and a verb of wiſhing, ſuch as *opto* or *cupio*, in the firſt perſon of the preſent of the indicative. *Te teneam, te ſpectem. Opto, cupio te tenere, te ſpectare.* It has been found unneceſſary, but it would undoubtedly be poſſible, and on ſome occaſions might be uſeful, to have grammatical moods, either by inflection or by arrangement, (like *may I hold, may I ſee*) to denote *ſpero te tenere, deſpero te tenere, confido te tenere*, or *te ſpectaturum.*

THE *interrogative mood* is not reſolvable exactly in the ſame way, by the primary verb without mood, and the *indicative* of another verb: there is another ſtep in it; and, after all, the reſolution is ſtill leſs perfect than in the other moods.

Quid faciam? Moriar? et Amyntam perdet Amyntas?

The meaning here is more than merely, *Cupio ſcire quid facturus ſim, utrum moriar necne, num Amyntas ſemet perditurus ſit.* Even *Rogo, Jubeo, aliquem, mihi dicere quid faciam, quid debuero*

facere, &c. does not fully expreſs it. The *energy* of interrogation, in point of thought, admits of a more cloſe and perfect combination with the conception denoted by a verb, than can well be expreſſed by any circumlocution *; but it is fully denoted by the interrogative mood, as appears by the perſon who is addreſſed in that mood returning a pertinent anſwer. This, which is ſo manifeſt with reſpect to the interrogative mood, is equally true with reſpect to all the other moods.

WONDER has a *kind of mood* appropriated to the expreſſing of it, made out by the addition of a particle, originally of interrogative meaning, to the indicative mood; at leaſt, I think it is ſo in all the languages that I am acquainted with.

Quam timeo quorſum evadas. TER.

Quam pene furvæ regna Proſerpinæ,
Et judicantem vidimus Æacum. HOR.

Tela quam certo moderatur arcu. SEN.

Qu'il eſt cruel—qu'il eſt doux d'etre Pere!
DIDEROT Pere de Famille.

How fearful and dizzy 'tis to caſt one's eyes ſo low!

How many thouſands of my pooreſt ſubjects are at this hour aſleep! SHAKES.

NONE of theſe ſentences are interrogations, or can admit of an anſwer. They all expreſs (in addition to the general meaning

* I BELIEVE the neareſt we can come to it is by the uſe of the imperative of a verb of affirming with the infinitive of the primary verb.

Dic mihi Damœta cujum pecus, an Melibœi?
Cujus eſt pecus? Dic cujus pecus eſt.
Jubeo te mihi dicere cujus pecus eſt.

ing of the primary verbs) the emotion of wonder, or ſome mixed emotion, of which wonder forms a part. No perſon can doubt that this *energy* might have been expreſſed by inflection of the verb; and that, if it had been ſo, ſuch inflection *muſt* have been reckoned a perfect grammatical mood, and might have been reſolved, though no doubt but imperfectly, into a ſentence containing the primary verb, (*timeo*, *video*, &c.) and ſome verb, or phraſe containing a verb, expreſſive of wonder, or ſome ſimilar emotion. *Miror me tam pene vidiſſe regna Proſerpinæ, miror quantum timeo, mirus eſt timor meus, quorſum evaïdas.* I wonder, tremble, ſhudder, to caſt my eyes ſo low. I admire, it is admirable, that many of my ſubjects are at this hour aſleep.

With reſpect to the *grammatical mood* called the *ſubjunctive*, it muſt be obſerved, that it (like many words in common language) has different meanings, or expreſſes different *energies*, combined with the radical meaning of the verb, ſuch as, wiſh, (already conſidered) ſuppoſition, power, condition, *&c.* It muſt be in vain, therefore, to look for any one verb, or any one thought or energy, by means of which the ſubjunctive mood may uniformly be reſolved, as the indicative may be by *dico*, the optative by *opto*, the interrogative by *rogo*, the imperative by *jubeo*. It is to be reſolved occaſionally by means of different verbs, according to the particular energy or mood of thought expreſſed in any inſtance. Of this indeed there can be no better proof than the number of different auxiliary words which we employ in Engliſh to make out what we call the ſubjunctive mood in all its *tenſes*, ſuch as, *may*, *can*, *might*, *could*, *would*, *ſhould*, which are, by no means, ſynonymous and convertible terms, even in this application of them, and yet all correſpond occaſionally to the Latin ſubjunctive mood, which is ſimple, and only marked by inflection.

Crediderim, *poſſum credere*, I might believe; *credidiſſem*, *potui credere*, I might have believed. Condition, ſtipulation, ſuppo-

ſition, which, though ſomewhat different, are very near akin, are among the moſt frequent meanings of the ſubjunctive mood. This meaning, or mood of thought, may be reſolved, to a certain degree, into an imperative mood (the reſolution of which hath already been ſhewn) and the primary verb. An ingenious etymologiſt * has ſhewn, that the Greek particle εἰ, and the Roman *ſi*, are but contractions of certain parts or inflections of the ſubſtantive verbs, εἰμι and *ſum;* which parts of thoſe verbs have an imperative meaning, *Be it ſo.* The ſame author ſhows, that our Engliſh particle *if* is juſt a contraction of the imperative of the verb *give*, anciently written and pronounced *gif*. *Si vis me flere. Sit, eſto, quod vis*, or *velis me flere. Fac, pone, te velle me flere.* The imperative *fac* was often uſed by the ancient writers of Latin in this ſenſe; *pone* ſeldom by them, but often by modern writers; τιθει was uſed in the ſame ſenſe by the Greeks. Indeed, different parts, both of τιθημι and of *pono*, were uſed for this purpoſe; the Romans, I preſume, imitating the Greeks. It is worthy of obſervation, that in French, the uſe of the conditional particle *ſi* ſuperſedes completely the uſe, either of the ſubjunctive or of the conditional mood. *Si* in French always governs the indicative mood. *Si je peux, ſi je pouvois, ſi je pourrai;* never *Si je puiſſe, ſi je puſſe*, in the *ſubjunctive*, nor even *ſi je pourrois* in the *conditional mood*.

As to the circumſtance of being ſubjoined to a preceding member of a ſentence, and commonly to a verb in the indicative mood, from which the ſubjunctive has got its name, the difference of meaning between the ſubjunctive ſo employed, and that of the indicative in ſome caſes, and between it and the bare infinitive in others, is ſo minute, that it is difficult to aſcertain it, and perhaps impoſſible to expreſs it in words. Accordingly, we often find, that in tranſlating from one language into another, thoſe three grammatical moods *may* and perhaps

* Mr Horne Tooke.

perhaps *muſt* be interchanged, to preſerve the original meaning, without violating the idiom of the language into which the tranſlation is made. But the uſe of a peculiar inflection or mood to diſtinguiſh the ſecondary or ſubjoined verb from the fundamental or primary verb in a ſentence, often has its uſe; and I think, without much refinement, we muſt perceive an elegance, and perhaps too a greater degree of preciſion, in thoſe languages in which this nicety is attended to, as in Latin and in French; for in our own it is almoſt loſt ſight of. But it muſt be obſerved, that it is not every verb ſubjoined to another by the relative pronoun *qui*, that is put in the ſubjunctive mood. In many caſes, either the indicative or the ſubjunctive may be employed, almoſt indiſcriminately, both in Latin and in French. But ſometimes the one, ſometimes the other, ought to be uſed. Where the affirmation is certain and poſitive, the indicative ſhould be ſubjoined to the indicative.

—— *Heu quoties fidem,*
Mutatoſque deos FLEBIT: *et aſpera*
Nigris æquora ventis
EMIRABITUR *inſolens,*
QUI *nunc te* FRUITUR *credulus aurea:*
QUI *ſemper vacuam, ſemper amabilem*
SPERAT, *neſcius auræ*
Fallacis: miſeri, QUIBUS
Intentata NITES.

Cependant je RENDS *grace au zele officieux,*
QUI *ſur tous mes perils vous* FAIT *ouvrir les yeux.*

Jeune et vaillant heros, DONT *la haute ſageſſe*
N'EST *point le fruit tardif d'une lente vieilleſſe.*

Though in theſe lines of BOILEAU, there be no verb but *eſt*, IT is plainly ſubjoined to the preceding member of the ſentence

tence by means of the relative *dont*. *Ne ſoit point le fruit*, would, in the firſt place, be bad French, and, in the next place, would have been a very impertinent inſinuation to LOUIS XIV. as if his high wiſdom had been ſomehow contingent, or hypothetical. But BOILEAU was not a man likely to fall into either of theſe errors.

ON the ſame principle, I preſume, the indicative mood is ſubjoined to the indicative, in the following paſſage of the Holy Scripture: *Je ſuis l'Eternel ton Dieu, qui t'* AI *tiré du pais d'Egypte, de la maiſon de ſervitude.* The ſubjunctive mood, *Qui t'* AYE *tiré*, would manifeſtly be inelegant and inaccurate in this place, where the ſubjoined affirmation is poſitive and certain. And for the ſame reaſon, we ſhould never heſitate to expreſs the ſame thought in Latin by the words, *Ego ſum Dominus tuus Deus, qui* EDUXI *te e terra Ægypti, e domo ſervitutis;* and ſhould be ſenſible of a groſs impropriety, if the word *eduxerim* were ſubſtituted for *eduxi*.

BUT in innumerable inſtances, wherein the ſubjoined verb expreſſes any thing uncertain, precarious, contingent, or dependent on the will or power of another, it is put in the ſubjunctive mood: hence this mood has, in all its *tenſes*, a ſort of affinity or relation to a *future* meaning. Still, however, great latitude is allowed to writers, both in proſe and verſe, and is actually taken by the beſt of them, in the uſe of the indicative and of the ſubjunctive moods; as in the following inſtances from VIRGIL and CICERO.

QUID FACIAT *lætas ſegetes,* QUO SIDERE *terram*
Vertere, Mæcenas, ulmiſque adjungere vites
CONVENIAT: QUÆ CURA *Boum,* QUI CULTUS *habendo*
SIT *pecori, apibus quanta experientia parcis,*
Hinc canere incipiam.

Vos,

—— *Vos, O clariſſima mundi*
Lumina, labentem cœlo QUÆ DUCITIS *annum,*
Liber, et alma Ceres; veſtro ſi munere Tellus
Chaoniam pingui glandem MUTAVIT *ariſta,*
Poculaque inventis Acheloia MISCUIT *uvis:*
Munera veſtra cano. Tuque O CUI *prima frementem*
FUDIT *equum magno tellus percuſſa tridenti,*
Neptune: et cultor nemorum CUI *pinguia Cea*
Ter centum nivei TONDENT *dumeta juvenci.*

Enumerare poſſum QUÆ SIT *in figuris animantium, et quam ſolers ſubtiliſque deſcriptio partium, quamque admirabilis fabrica membrorum. Omnia enim* QUÆ *quidem intus incluſa* SUNT *ita nata, atque ita locata ſunt,* UT *nihil eorum ſupervacaneum* SIT, *nihil ad vitam retinendam non neceſſarium.*

CUJUS *quidem adminiſtratio nihil* HABET *in ſe* QUOD *reprehendi* POTEST; *ex iis enim naturis* QUÆ ERANT, QUOD *effici* POTUIT *optimum effectum eſt: doceat ergo aliquis potuiſſe melius: ſed nemo unquam docebit: et* SIQUIS *corrigere aliquid* VOLET, *aut deterius faciet, aut id, quod fieri not* POTEST, *deſiderabit.*

IN theſe paſſages, the ſubjoined verbs are marked in capitals. They are to the number of ſeventeen; yet of them no leſs than twelve are put in the indicative mood. And it may be obſerved, at leaſt with reſpect to the two paſſages from CICERO, that the meaning expreſſed by the ſubjoined indicative is not diſtinguiſhable, in ſeveral caſes, from that which, in other caſes, is expreſſed by the ſubjunctive mood.

THESE more particular obſervations, and the well known general fact, that, in our own language, we find means to diſpenſe with the uſe of a peculiar grammatical mood, to denote barely the circumſtance of being ſubjoined, I apprehend coincide perfectly with the account given of the comprehenſive and various meanings of that grammatical mood which is called

called the ſubjunctive, and amount to a full confirmation of that account.

II. The ſecond of thoſe concluſions can ſcarce require any explanation or commentary. The modification or mood of thought, which is moſt commonly expreſſed by a grammatical mood of a verb, is unqueſtionably that of affirmation, under which we may comprehend negation, or elſe we muſt uſe the more general term *propoſition*, which comprehends them both. This is expreſſed by the indicative mood. Next to this, the moods of thought, moſt commonly expreſſed by verbs, are thoſe of command and of interrogation; the latter (at leaſt in all the languages that I know any thing of) being *uſually* expreſſed, either by the addition of ſome particle to the common indicative mood, or elſe by ſome peculiar arrangement of the words connected with a verb in that mood. *Vidiſti*, *Thou ſaweſt* or *thou didſt ſee*. *Vidiſtine? Saweſt thou*, or *Didſt thou ſee?* Sometimes, however, it is not expreſſed in either of theſe ways, nor in any way but merely by the tone of voice of the ſpeaker; and conſequently, when it is written, and read ſilently, it cannot be diſtinguiſhed from a propoſition. *Fervet avaritia pectus. Laudis amore tumes.* Hence the uſe of points or marks of interrogation in writing. The former (command) is commonly expreſſed by a diſtinct grammatical mood.

These three moods are all plainly ſocial modifications of thought. No man could be ſuppoſed even to *form* (not to ſay *utter*) a propoſition, a queſtion, or a command, who did not believe that there were other intelligent Beings beſides himſelf, who might underſtand him. In general too, (for I admit there may be exceptions to this) the perſon who utters a propoſition wiſhes to be believed, he who gives a command wiſhes to be obeyed, he who puts a queſtion wiſhes to be anſwered, and all of them wiſh to be underſtood. Theſe are all operations of

thought,

thought, which cannot be ſuppoſed to take place in a ſolitary Being.

BUT there are ſome moods of thought denoted by the grammatical moods of verbs, (more or leſs perfectly) which are not, ſtrictly ſpeaking, ſocial acts of the mind; for inſtance, wiſhing, ſuppoſing, wondering. Theſe may all be ſuppoſed to take place in a ſolitary being, like ROBINSON CRUSOE in his iſland, as well as in CICERO in the Forum of Rome.

THE greateſt part, even of common converſation, conſiſts of *propoſitions;* and whole volumes, both in hiſtory and in ſcience, may be, and perhaps have been written, conſiſting entirely of propoſitions, and of courſe requiring no other mood but the indicative.

BUT in common converſation, and ſtill more remarkably in all buſtling and intereſting ſcenes, commands and queſtions muſt occur, and, of courſe, the interrogative and imperative moods, however formed and marked, become neceſſary.

NEXT to theſe purely ſocial acts of the mind, or poſſibly not leſs frequent or important even than them, is the familiar and intereſting emotion of wiſhing. And this emotion or energy of thought we often have occaſion to expreſs or communicate to thoſe among whom we live and with whom we converſe; ſo that although it be not of itſelf, ſtrictly ſpeaking, a ſocial act of the mind, yet it is plainly very near akin to one, and may almoſt be ſaid to become one when combined with that of affirmation, as it is when expreſſed by the optative mood in common diſcourſe; for it would not be ſo in ſoliloquy. Now, theſe are the modifications of thought, which, in moſt languages that are tolerably perfect, are expreſſed by grammatical moods in one way or another.

III. THE third concluſion, "That the grammatical moods "of verbs are conciſe modes of expreſſing the moſt frequent "modifications of thought, (and the moſt important or in-

" tereſting of them)" is ſelf-evident, when we compare them with the circumlocutions into which it is thought they may be reſolved. But it will be illuſtrated more fully than is neceſſary here, in conſidering the two laſt concluſions.

IV. As to the fourth concluſion, it muſt be very plain to us all, from the experience we have had of different languages, that none of them are in every reſpect, nay hardly in any reſpect, abſolutely perfect; and correſponding, either by the variety of words which they afford, or by the modifications, inflections, and arrangements of thoſe words, to all the varieties and niceties of human thought. It is only the moſt common and familiar thoughts or notions that have particular words in all common languages to denote them, and only the familiar and frequent combinations of thoughts that have appropriated phraſes to expreſs them. New notions require new words to denote them, as new combinations of thoughts, of which the variety is endleſs, require new phraſes and ſentences. In this way, languages gradually improve, at leaſt in point of richneſs, copiouſneſs, and preciſion.

But it is only the moſt frequent of all combinations of thought with that which is the general meaning of a verb, ſuch as affirmation, interrogation, command, wiſh, *&c.* that are expreſſed by ſuch inflections or variations of the primary verb, as may be called grammatical moods. Theſe are the combinations of thought, in the expreſſing of which, circumlocution, or tediouſneſs of any kind, would be the moſt diſagreeable and inconvenient; and for which, therefore, a quick and ſimple mode of communication is moſt requiſite. Many other combinations of thoughts may be expreſſed by the combination of different verbs with ſufficient quickneſs, and without inconvenience or diſagreeableneſs of any kind. The number of grammatical moods cannot be infinite. It is plainly limited, partly by the difficulty of contriving a great number of diſtinct inflections,

flections, partly too from the obvious difficulty of remembering and employing accurately even ſuch a number as might undoubtedly be contrived, but much more from there being no urgent occaſion for ſuch a variety of them; many of the combinations of thoughts to be expreſſed by verbs being ſo near akin, that they would naturally be claſſed together, and might be denoted by one grammatical mood, without danger of any ambiguity or obſcurity; as for inſtance, the various moods of thought which are occaſionally expreſſed by the grammatical imperative, or by the future tenſe of the indicative; all the diſtinctions of which moods of thought, both in kind and in degree, may be fully underſtood by thoſe to whom the diſcourſe is addreſſed, from a variety of well known or obvious circumſtances. Hence I think it appears very natural, that though the poſſible number of grammatical moods be very great, (though by no means infinite) the number of actually ſubſiſting moods in different languages ſhould be very ſmall; and that ſome, even of theſe few, ſhould occaſionally be employed with little diſtinction; the ingenuity and labour of mankind in contriving, and their preciſion and ſteadineſs in employing ſuch moods, being chiefly regulated by the experience of what they daily had occaſion for.

V. THE fifth of thoſe concluſions reſpecting the importance of grammatical moods towards the perfection and beauty of language, by the quickneſs, animation, and force, which they give to the expreſſion of our moſt familiar and moſt intereſting modifications of thought, can require no other proof but mere illuſtration by proper examples, any number of which may eaſily and readily be found. And from theſe it will plainly appear, that the moods of verbs are in a manner eſſential to eloquence of almoſt every kind. " L'éloquence" (as M. D'ALEMBERT very juſtly obſerves, and propoſes to define it) " eſt le " talent de faire paſſer avec rapidité, et d'imprimer avec force,

" dans l'ame des autres, le ſentiment profond dont on eſt péne-
" tré. Cette definition convient à l'éloquence même du ſilence,
" langage energique et quelquefois ſublime des grandes paſ-
" ſions ; à l'éloquence du geſte, qu'on peut appeller l'éloquence
" du peuple, par le pouvoir qu'elle a pour ſubjuguer la multi-
" tude, toujours plus frappée de ce qu'elle voit que de ce qu'elle
" entend ; enfin à cette éloquence adroite et tranquille, qui ſe
" borne à convaincre ſans emouvoir, et qui ne cherche point à
" arracher le conſentement, mais à l'obtenir. Cette dernière
" éſpece d'éloquence n'eſt peutêtre pas la moins puiſſante ; on
" eſt moins en garde contre l'inſinuation que contre la force."
D'ALEMBERT *Diſcours à l'Academie Françoiſe, et Reflexions ſur l'Eloquence Oratoire. Melanges*, Vol. II. p. 304, 305. 319.

OF all the moods of thought which are commonly expreſſed by grammatical moods, the indicative (comprehending the ſimple *ſubjunctive)* though one of the moſt important, and moſt frequently employed, is plainly one of the leaſt animated or intereſting, from the nature of the thought expreſſed by it, which is merely propoſition, that is, affirmation and negation. Though animation and force be little needed, yet brevity and quickneſs are of much conſequence in the expreſſing of this combination of thoughts. Had we not an indicative mood to expreſs it briefly, and in one word, our converſation and writing would be intolerably ſlow and tedious, and conſequently feeble and diſagreeable. We ſhould be obliged to employ at leaſt two verbs inſtead of one, and after all ſhould have but a very inaccurate and clumſy expreſſion of a thought, which we ſhould wiſh to communicate as preciſely and diſtinctly as poſſible. *Fuit Ilium* could not be reſolved into *Dico Ilium fuiſſe ;* for *dico* is itſelf an indicative, reſolvable in the ſame way with *fuit; aio, inquam, aſſero, aſſevero, &c. me dicere.* Without the uſe of grammatical moods, we could get no nearer to a reſolution of *fuit Ilium* than *ego dicere fuiſſe Ilium.* Or dropping the inflections which ſerve to diſtinguiſh the infinitives from the moods,

moods, properly ſo called, and taking only the roots or baſes of the verbs reſpectively, *Ego dic— fu— Ilium.* Any perſon may eaſily try the effect of ſuch a reſolution of any plain elegant compoſition, either in proſe or verſe, wherein the indicative and ſimply ſubjunctive moods are chiefly or ſolely employed; as for inſtance, the following beautiful lines of OVID, containing an account of PYTHAGORAS.

Vir FUIT *hic ortu Samius: ſed* FUGERAT *una*
Et Samon et dominos; odioque tyrannidis exul
Sponte ERAT: *iſque licet cœli regione remotus*
Mente deos ADIIT: *et quæ Natura* NEGABAT
Viſibus humanis, oculis ea pectoris HAUSIT.
Cumque animo, et vigili PERSPEXERAT *omnia cura,*
In medium diſcenda DABAT: *cœtumque ſilentum,*
Dictaque mirantum, magni primordia mundi,
Et rerum cauſſas, et quid Natura, DOCEBAT:
Quid Deus; unde nives; quæ fulminis ESSET *origo:*
Juppiter, an venti, diſcuſſa nube TONARENT:
Quid QUATERET *terras; qua ſidera lege* MEARENT;
Et quodcunque LATET. *Primuſque animalia menſis*
ARCUIT *imponi: primus quoque talibus ora*
Docta quidem SOLVIT, *ſed non et credita, verbis.*

IN theſe fifteen lines, there are ſixteen verbs, either in the indicative or in the ſimply ſubjunctive mood. Without the uſe of ſuch a mood, the thoughts expreſſed in the lines, ſimple and eaſy of apprehenſion as they may appear, could hardly have been expreſſed intelligibly; or if this, with much labour and ingenuity, could be accompliſhed, ſtill the beauty, the charm, of the compoſition would be completely loſt. The poet, the orator, the philoſopher, the hiſtorian, and indeed every perſon who has the gift of ſpeech, or who makes uſe of language in any way, has almoſt conſtant occaſion to employ that mood,

and

and muſt ſeverely feel the want of it, whatever reſolution or circumlocution he might contrive inſtead of it. It is evident, that, in many caſes in real life, a ſlow and tedious expreſſion of the thought denoted by the indicative mood, ſuppoſing that it could be made ſufficiently intelligible, would not only be diſagreeable, but might ſcarce ſerve the purpoſe required; it might come too late. In certain circumſtances, a perſon's life and fortune may depend on his quickneſs in expreſſing what he means to communicate. Even where nothing of that kind is at ſtake, the difference between a quick and a ſlow tedious expreſſion of thought, is very ſtriking and important. Language is at beſt, and after all its improvements, not only leſs perfect and accurate, but incomparably ſlower, than thought; the quickneſs of which is proverbial, and with great reaſon. I believe it is even in many caſes much quicker than we are commonly aware of. We all know, that we can, in a very few ſeconds, recollect a vaſt number of things in ſucceſſion; ſuch as the various circumſtances of a ſtory, in which perhaps many different perſons were concerned, and many different events occurred, or the various ſcenes through which we paſſed in the courſe of a long journey. But to tell ſuch a ſtory intelligibly, or to deſcribe particularly ſuch ſcenes, even with the help of the moſt perfect language, might be the work of hours. In a certain ſtate of imperfect ſleep, in which dreams moſt commonly occur, or at leaſt are moſt diſtinct and beſt remembered, the train of thought appears to be incomparably quicker than we can ever make it, while awake, by any voluntary exertion. There is reaſon to think, that ſometimes a ſudden noiſe, which, to a careleſs obſerver, might ſeem to waken a perſon inſtantaneouſly and perfectly, may yet give occaſion to a *long* dream, in an almoſt imperceptible interval of time. I call the dream *long*, though it may paſs in a ſingle ſecond or leſs, when it conſiſts of a great or numerous ſeries of imaginary events, the narration of which would be long in

point

point of time; like the adventure of the Sultan in the Arabian Nights Entertainments, who, on dipping his head into water, had a long and vexatious ſeries of adventures, for ſeven years, as he thought, in the ſhort ſpace of time in which his head was in the water. Even when we are awake, a voluntary train of thought, eſpecially when much connected with emotion or paſſion, is ſometimes ſo quick that we are unable to expreſs it in words, or at leaſt to do it any juſtice in point of quickneſs. Before we can expreſs even the hundredth part of it, the reſt of it is gone, and cannot be recalled but ſlowly, and with much labour. We can often obſerve, both in common converſation, and in public ſpeaking, that a perſon hath gone on much farther in thought than he has expreſſed in words. Many people cannot tell to any purpoſe either a ludicrous or a pathetic ſtory for laughing or weeping. The whole train of thought ruſhes on their minds ſo quickly as to overpower them with its full effect, before they have expreſſed enough to let their hearers know any thing of it, nay ſometimes before they begin to ſpeak.

Format enim natura prius nos intus ad omnem
Fortunarum habitum: juvat aut impellit ad iram,
Aut ad humum mœrore gravi deducit et angit:
Mox effert animi motus interprete lingua.

SOME of the moſt intereſting modifications of thought, I mean emotions and paſſions, expreſs themſelves by natural language, that is by the countenance, voice and geſture, almoſt as quickly as they are conceived; and when they are expreſſed in this way, they are not only well underſtood by others, but are often in ſome meaſure communicated to them. For ſuch is the nature of man, that, independently of all religious precepts, and of all moral conſiderations, we are ſtrongly, and often irreſiſtibly diſpoſed to rejoice with thoſe that do rejoice,

joice, and weep with thoſe that weep. This we muſt all have ſeen, and to a certain degree felt, even in common converſation. We can often obſerve, that one very cheerful, or one very melancholy perſon quickly communicates his ſtate of mind to a whole company. We feel the ſame to a ſtill greater degree in ſcenes of real diſtreſs, or of violent emotions of any kind, and often to a very high degree from exquiſite theatrical repreſentation. The ſame principle extends to the ſpreading of the military ardour or of a pannic among ſoldiers, of civil fury among a mob, and of religious fanaticiſm, ſometimes even among people who did not apprehend any ſuch danger to themſelves.

NEXT to this inſtantaneous and moſt effectual expreſſion and communication of thought by natural language, is the quick tranſmiſſion of it by very brief expreſſions in artificial language. The beauty and force (that is, the quick, and powerful, and pleaſing, effect) of ſuch quick and brief expreſſions has been generally acknowledged, and felt, and admired. The chief, and ſometimes perhaps the only merit of certain apophthegms, or good ſayings, conſiſts in the brevity, and conſequently force of the expreſſion *. Among the Spartans, this ſtyle of ſpeaking and writing was ſo much admired as to become a matter of ſtudy, and conſequently ſometimes of affectation. It is certain, that many thoughts, which appear ſtriking and admirable, when expreſſed in one or two words, are feeble and frivolous, when expreſſed at full length, eſpecially when put into pompous language. On the ſame principle too, we may underſtand how it comes to paſs, that brevity, and the employment of few and ſimple words, are eſſential to the ſublime in literary compoſition; which is a well known and important fact.

WE are ſo apt to be diſguſted with a very full and preciſe expreſſion of thought, eſpecially on ſubjects which are familiar to

* Videſis PLUTARCH's Apophthegms.

to us, or at leaſt are ſuppoſed to be ſo, that many people who are accuſtomed to the elegant, and often conciſe and animated, compoſitions of hiſtorians, orators, and poets, cannot be reconciled to that accurate enunciation of propoſitions and of arguments in proof of them, which is often indiſpenſibly neceſſary for ſtrict reaſoning; or if they can bring themſelves to liſten to the propoſitions and demonſtrations of geometry, when expreſſed in this way, they will not ſo readily admit that there is the ſame occaſion for ſuch fulneſs and accuracy of expreſſion on any other ſubject, not even in metaphyſics; hence the vague, inconcluſive, and often abſurd reaſonings, which have produced both diſguſt and diſtruſt of ſuch ſpeculations.

GRAMMATICAL language, in general, and eſpecially the modern languages, afford ſuch flow expreſſions of thought, that often before we have heard or read the half of a ſentence, we apprehend the meaning of the whole of it, and, of courſe, the latter part of it is not merely ſuperfluous and tedious, but in many caſes quite diſguſting.

IF we could expreſs our thoughts by grammatical language as quickly and conciſely as we can by natural language, and without loſing any thing of that diſtinctneſs and preciſion which artificial language gives to the expreſſion of them, it would unqueſtionably be a great improvement in language, in point of agreeableneſs, animation, and force. I doubt whether it would be equally favourable in ſcience. I am diſpoſed to think that the ſlowneſs, or even tediouſneſs, of the expreſſion of our thoughts on certain ſubjects of profound reaſoning, has its uſe, by giving us time and opportunity, and almoſt forcing us, to attend to every particular thing, and its relations to other things, about which we reaſon. But even this has its limits; and mathematical demonſtration itſelf, as we find it in the writings of the ancient geometers, is but an abridged chain of ſyllogiſms. And it is ſtill further abridged in many caſes, by thoſe who are perfect maſters of it, by omitting many of

the more minute and eaſy ſteps which thoſe who are well accuſtomed to ſuch reaſonings quickly and eaſily ſupply for themſelves, and find pleaſure in this quickneſs and brevity; while, on the contrary, they are tired and diſguſted with that ſlow and tedious expoſition of every ſtep in the reaſoning, which to them is needleſs, but perhaps would be neceſſary for the inſtruction of thoſe of inferior talents and knowledge.

A GRAMMATICAL language, as quick as thought, and as conciſe as natural language, is manifeſtly unattainable. But every approximation to it is valuable. All the moods of verbs, even the indicative and the ſimple ſubjunctive, are ſuch approximations.

IF theſe obſervations be true, with reſpect to the indicative and ſimply ſubjunctive mood, and the plain and tranquil expreſſion of mere propoſition, how much more important and ſtriking muſt the correſponding differences be, between the conciſe and quick expreſſions of ſuch intereſting and animated combinations of thoughts, as interrogation, command, wiſh, *&c.* by the grammatical moods of verbs, and the ſlow, languid enunciations of the ſame or ſimilar thoughts, by circumlocution and the uſe of additional verbs?

THERE is a juſt and beautiful obſervation of LONGINUS, relating to this ſubject, which will fairly admit of much more extenſive application than he has made of it, and is in truth more important than he ſeems to have been aware of. He takes notice of interrogation as a figure of rhetoric, by which an orator endeavours to render the expreſſion of his thoughts more animated and forcible. Τι δ' εκεινα φωμεν τας πευσεις τε και ερωτησεις; αρα εκ αυταις ταις των σχηματων ειδοποιιαις παραπολυ εμπρακτοτερα και σοβαρωτερα συντεινει τα λεγομενα; LONGINUS *de Sublim.* Sect. xviii. This opinion he illuſtrates, in ſome meaſure, by the manner in which he expreſſes it, namely, by the uſe of the very figure of interrogation of which he is treating; and ſtill better by a very apt quotation from the firſt Philippic

of

of DEMOSTHENES. Η βελεσθε, ειπε μοι, περιοντες αλληλων πυνθανεσθαι κατα την αγοραν, λεγεται τι καινον; γενοιτο γαρ αν τι καινοτερον, η Μακεδων ανηρ Αθηναιους καταπολεμων, και τα των Ἑλληνων διοικων; τεθνηκε Φιλιππος; ου μα Δι' αλλ' ασθενει· τι δ' ὑμιν διαφερει; &c.

THE juſtneſs of LONGINUS's remark on this paſſage, and indeed his general obſervation with reſpect to the animation and force of interrogation, employed as a figure of rhetoric, can, I think, admit of no diſpute. But even the truth of it, and our ready acquieſcence in it, implies that he was, and that we too are, ſenſible of ſomething more animated and forcible in an interrogation, even literally employed, as in common life, than in a circuitous expreſſion of the ſame thought; elſe it never could have been employed, nor thought of, as an animated figure of ſpeech.

EVEN the ſimple interrogation, *Who is that?* is evidently more animated and forcible, as well as more conciſe, than *I deſire you to tell me who that is*, or *I deſire to be informed who that is.* The ſame is equally obvious with reſpect to *go*, *come*, *do this*, *te ſpectem*, *te teneam*, ὑμιν μεν θεοι δοιεν, if we compare them with *I order you to go*, *I command you to come*, *I deſire you to do this*, *cupio te ſpectare*, *opto te tenere*, λισσομαι τȣς θεȣς ὑμιν διδοναι, or, λεγ— λισσ— θεȣς ὑμιν δο—; which is employing merely the roots, without any inflection whatever of the three verbs, the meaning of all of which, to wit, affirmation, wiſh, and giving, is briefly, but fully and clearly, and conſequently forcibly expreſſed by the Greek optative δοιεν.

THE more urgent the occaſion is, and the more intereſted the paſſions become, the more important is the brevity and force of theſe moods to the expreſſion of our thoughts. This, which is obvious even in common life, is ſtill more ſtriking in thoſe animated and intereſting repreſentations of real life, which we have in dramatic poetry; to a great part of which it may fairly be ſaid that theſe moods are eſſential.

In the great diſcovery ſcene in *Oedipus Tyrannus*, there are not fewer than 150 interrogative and imperative ſentences; any one of which would be murdered, and the effect of the ſcene ſpoiled, by uſing circumlocution by means of a verb of aſking or of commanding.

In the paſſionate ſcenes of *Lear* and of *Othello*, ſeveral hundreds of ſimilar inſtances may eaſily be found.

In the diſcovery ſcene in *Douglas*, ſome of the fineſt ſtrokes of paſſion, of anxiety, of wonder, of horror, of eager curioſity, are conveyed by means of the moods of verbs, and would be loſt in any circumlocution.

Was he alive?

—— *Inhuman that thou art*
How couldſt thou kill what winds and tempeſts ſpared?

Even Rowe, amidſt all his golden verſe, was not unmindful of the force and animation which the moods of verbs give to the expreſſion of thought.

—— *Does he? Does Haſtings?*

Reward him for the noble deed, juſt Heaven.

For this one action, *guard* him, and *diſtinguiſh* him,
With ſignal mercies, and with great deliverance;
Save him from wrong, adverſity, and ſhame;
Let never fading honours *flouriſh* round him;
And *conſecrate* his name even to time's end;
Let him know nothing elſe but good on earth,
And everlaſting bleſſedneſs hereafter.

The poor, forſaken, royal little ones!
Shall they be left a prey to ſavage power?
Can they lift up their harmleſs hands in vain,
Or *cry to Heaven* for help, and not be heard?
Impoſſible!

Go on, purſue, aſſert the ſacred cauſe, *ſtand forth* and *ſave.*—— *Jane Shore, act* 4. *ſc.* 1.

Alas! *I never wrong'd you*—
Oh! then *be good* to me, *have pity* on me;
Thou never knew'ſt the bitterneſs of want,
And *may'ſt thou never know it.* Oh! *beſtow*
Some poor remain——
Allow me but
The ſmalleſt pittance. *Act* 5.

THE genius of SOPHOCLES and of SHAKESPEARE, and the talents of GARRICK and SIDDONS united, could not make ſuch ſentiments as thoſe of *Lear*, and *Othello*, and *Oedipus*, and *Lady Randolph*, and *Jane Shore*, intereſting, or even tolerable, to any reader or ſpectator of taſte and judgment, if they were expreſſed in minute detail, by ſuch circumlocutions as the grammatical moods of verbs may be reſolved into.

THE fineſt inſtance that can be given, or indeed ſuppoſed, of the truth of this principle, we have in HOMER, in the admirable ſpeech of *Priam* to *Achilles*, when he goes to beg the body of his ſon *Hector*. This ſpeech has been univerſally admired, as perhaps the moſt eloquent that ever was compoſed. Though it be exquiſite in every part, the exordium, and indeed the very firſt ſentence of it, is by far the moſt ſtriking and eloquent part of it. This too HOMER ſeems to have felt and underſtood perfectly; for he makes *Priam* repeat the ſame thought, and almoſt in the ſame words, at the end of his ſpeech, by way of peroration, and with a very happy effect. When *Priam* enters the tent of *Achilles*, and throws himſelf at his feet, his addreſs to him is moſt ſingularly ſtriking.

Μνησαι πατρος σειο θεοις επιεικελ' Αχιλλευ,
Τηλικω ὡσπερ εγων, ολοῳ επι γηραος ουδῳ.

Think

Think of thy father, O god-like Achilles, old like me, and on the brink of the grave. Poſſibly there is a force and propriety in the uſe of the aoriſtic imperative μνησαι, inſtead of the preſent imperative, which would be more intelligible to HOMER's countrymen than it can be to us. Perhaps to them the difference between thoſe two forms of the imperative mood might be as great as it is to us between *think of* and *be thinking of*, the imperative of the aoriſt being a more vehement, ſudden and urgent requeſt or command than the imperative preſent μναου, but yet not diſreſpectful, like the imperative perfect μεμνησο, which, I believe, might be addreſſed to a ſlave, but could not, with propriety, be employed by a ſupplicant to an equal or to a ſuperior.

SOME nicety and delicacy of this kind ſeems to be expreſſed in the concluſion of *Priam's* ſpeech, by the uſe of the imperative preſent of one verb, and the imperative of the aoriſt of another, in the ſame line.

> Αλλ αιδειο θεες Αχιλευ, αυτον τ' ελεησον,
> Μνησαμενος σε πατρος·

Αιδειο, αιδου, αιδεου, is the imperative preſent of αιδεομαι; ελεησον is the imperative of the aoriſt of ελεω. The former ſeems a more tranquil and cool requeſt, or rather advice or ſuggeſtion, and refers to a continued, or frequently repeated, action, ſtate, or habit, to wit reverence to the Gods. The latter is a more urgent ſupplication for immediate pity and favour; as if he had ſaid, *Be ever mindful of your duty to the Gods, and inſtantly* (or *at this time, moment, &c.) have pity on me.*

WHATEVER may be thought of theſe ſpeculations and refinements, it can never be doubted, that if, inſtead of the imperative mood, we were to uſe a circumlocution, to expreſs the warm and vehement ſentiments of *Priam*, it would be inſupportable; λισσομαι σε μνησασθαι σε πατρος—αιδεισθαι τες θεες—αυτον ελεησαι. Such a flow and languid expreſſion would have ſuited

ſuited ill with thoſe ſentiments and actions which HOMER attributes to *Priam*. Indeed his actions, without his ſpeaking at all, would have been more pathetic and perſuaſive than they would have been with ſuch imperfect and improper expreſſions of his thoughts; but by means of the moods of verbs, it is poſſible to unite, to a certain degree, the advantages both of natural and of artificial language.

WE have many inſtances in poetry, as well as in oratory, of the *figurative* uſe of ſuch moods as I have juſt now been conſidering, and the effect of it, in enlivening and enforcing the expreſſion of the poet's ſentiments, is very ſtriking.

Can ſtoried urn, or animated buſt,
Back to its manſion call the fleeting breath?
Can honour's voice provoke the ſilent duſt?
Or flatt'ry ſooth the dull cold ear of death?

What female heart can gold deſpiſe?
What cat's averſe to fiſh? GRAY.

BUT while I thus point out how great a ſhare the conciſeneſs of the expreſſion of many thoughts, by means of grammatical moods, has in giving animation and force to language, I beg it may not be thought that I impute the animation and force of ſuch expreſſions *entirely* to that conciſeneſs. Many of the thoughts to be expreſſed are in themſelves highly animated and intereſting; and, on this very account, conciſeneſs in the expreſſing of them is peculiarly agreeable, and even neceſſary.

VI. THE ſixth and laſt concluſion reſpecting the import of the moods of verbs, is very intimately connected with the preceding. It relates not merely to the brevity and quickneſs of the expreſſion of thought, but to the intimate combination, and ſimultaneous exhibition, of the ſigns of thoughts, which

thoughts

thoughts are themſelves co-exiſtent, and moſt intimately combined. To this great property of thought, which has never yet been conſidered with that attention which it deſerves, inflections of words, and eſpecially the moods of verbs, do ſome kind of juſtice; while circumlocution of every ſort, even though it expreſs all the different thoughts, does manifeſt violence.

To explain this fully, would require a much longer and more elaborate diſquiſition concerning the nature of human thought than would be proper here. It may, however, be, in ſome meaſure, underſtood, by obſerving, that grammatical language, though the nobleſt of all human inventions, or, as ſome conceive, an art beyond the reach of our unaſſiſted faculties, and imparted to us by a kind of immediate inſpiration from Heaven, is, by no means, abſolutely perfect, nor even capable of ever becoming ſo. It anſwers admirably well for denoting many of our thoughts, either ſingly, or in various relations, particularly in ſucceſſion, and is even ſubſervient to the preciſion and ſteadineſs of thought, by the ſubdiviſion or decompoſition of the maſs of thought which it requires, and obliges us to make, not merely for the inventing, but for the learning, and the occaſional uſing, of language. It is indeed in many ways the chief inſtrument in the improvement of human reaſon. But in one very important reſpect, it is almoſt incongruous with the nature of that thought which it is employed to repreſent.

THE artificial ſigns, whether audible or viſible, that we uſe in grammatical language to denote our thoughts, are neceſſarily arranged, either in the order of time, or in that of place; and when we ſee the viſible ſigns arranged in the order of place, (as in reading) we attend to them, and occaſionally give them audible utterance in the order of time.

BUT our thoughts themſelves are not arranged in either of thoſe ways. It is ſelf-evident, that thoughts cannot be arranged in the order of place; at leaſt this will be ſelf-evident to every perſon

perſon who can ſhake off the long eſtabliſhed philoſophical hypotheſis of *ideas*, or images of things in the mind, as ſubſervient to thought; or even who will take the trouble to diſtinguiſh between ſuch ſuppoſed images, which, like thoſe of a magic lanthorn, may be conceived to be arranged in place, and the thoughts correſponding to them. And I believe it is equally certain, though not equally evident, that *many* of our thoughts are not even arranged in the order of time, but are related to one another in a very different manner, which is well underſtood, as being perfectly familiar to us, but which cannot be repreſented merely by the arrangement of words.

THAT *many* of our thoughts are arranged in the order of time, or, in other words, that there is a train or ſucceſſion of thought, is, I think, too evident and generally acknowledged to require either proof or illuſtration; and this relation among our thoughts may be fairly and completely repreſented by the ſucceſſion of audible words, and of courſe with ſufficient propriety by the arrangement of viſible words.

BUT this is perhaps the leaſt important of all the various relations of thought. Beſides the train or ſucceſſion of thoughts in time, there is often at once a great combination or maſs of thoughts variouſly related to one another. Such a maſs of thought we ſometimes wiſh to impart entire and all at once; ſometimes we wiſh to analyſe it, to break it down, as it were, and either to attend to it ourſelves, or to impart it to others, that they may attend to it, piece-meal.

FOR the latter purpoſe, the arrangement of words in grammatical language is admirably well adapted; for the former, it is in a great meaſure unſuitable. It gives disjointed, and in ſucceſſion, thoſe thoughts which we have united and ſimultaneous, and wiſh to communicate in the ſame way.

HENCE the importance of the great principle of inflection in grammatical language, and its ſuperiority to mere arrangement of words: Hence too the ſuperiority of thoſe languages which, having many and diſtinct inflections, admit of great variety

of arrangement. This is ſcarce required for mere reaſoning, but is of great value in poetry and eloquence, not only in point of ſound, but ſenſe, both with reſpect to the force of it, and the juſtneſs of the expreſſion of the various complicated and ſimultaneous relations of the things conceived.

Now, to inflection the moods of verbs plainly belong; and by them we expreſs the ſimultaneous combinations of the thoughts or *energies* of affirmation, interrogation, wiſh, command, and many others, with the thought or *accident* expreſſed by any verb; and when we expreſs theſe combinations by reſolution or circumlocution, by means of two or more verbs, we, in ſome meaſure, ſeparate in words what was moſt intimately blended in thought, and repreſent as ſucceſſive what we conceived, and wiſhed to impart, as ſimultaneous.

THIS doctrine will not be admitted by thoſe philoſophers who have aſſumed or admitted as a principle, that a perſon can have but one thought (or *idea)* at once. But this principle I diſregard, as I know of no proof of it, and as it ſeems to me inconſiſtent with many obvious phenomena, and even repugnant to direct conſciouſneſs. I ſuſpect that it has been adopted in conſequence of very careleſs obſervation, both of thought and of language; and I think it of ſome conſequence to be aware of the error of ſuch an opinion; for though it may appear, at firſt view, of little importance, whether we admit the ſimultaneous preſence, or only the immeaſurably quick ſucceſſion of different thoughts, yet the difference of theſe two principles may be found very great, on tracing their ſeveral conſequences. With reſpect to the moods and other inflections of verbs, I cannot think it ſhould admit of doubt, that they are employed and underſtood to denote combinations of ſimultaneous thoughts, no one of which can reaſonably be ſaid to occur to the perſon ſpeaking, or to be apprehended by the perſon hearing, before the reſt. *Specto, ſpectemus, ſpecta, ſpectaverunt, ſpectavitne?* All nouns, even proper names, denote a congeries of circumſtances,

ſtances, or a *maſs* (not a *train*) of thoughts, which are conceived at once, and cannot be ſeparated and conſidered in ſucceſſion, but by a very laborious effort. Many ſingle words, for example prepoſitions, and moſt ſentences, denote ſome kind of relation; but we cannot, I think, conceive a relation, without thinking at once of the things (two or more) that are related, as well as of the relation (both in its generic and in its ſpecific nature) that ſubſiſts between them.

MATHEMATICAL propoſitions are expreſſions of co-exiſtent thoughts, the objects of which (at leaſt in pure geometry) bear no relation at all to time; and theſe, to be conceived rightly or at all, muſt be conceived at once. Any ordinary perſon can do this with reſpect to an axiom, or even a very ſimple propoſition; and good mathematicians can do it with reſpect to very long and complex theorems, ſome of which ordinary people find almoſt inſuperable difficulty in apprehending. Part of this difficulty (as I feel very plainly in myſelf) ariſes from the number of things and relations that are to be thought of at once, and accordingly is not immediately removed, nor is it obviated, by even the moſt diſtinct and juſt conception of every one of thoſe things and relations taken ſingly. Correſponding to this difficulty in a learner, and juſt the oppoſite of it, is that of a teacher of almoſt any ſcience, and often of a ſpeaker, either in a public aſſembly or in common converſation, who may have a clear and juſt conception of a great maſs of thought, which he wiſhes to communicate to others, but can ſcarce contrive to do ſo, nor knows he well where or how to begin; and perhaps when he has begun right, or at leaſt diſtinctly, ſoon falls into ſuch confuſion and perplexity, as makes him almoſt or quite unintelligible to his hearers, even when he underſtands himſelf perfectly, and may know that another, more fortunate in the talent of communicating thought, has *helped him out*, or expreſſed diſtinctly and properly that very meaning which he was endeavouring in vain to convey to his hearers,

though as well acquainted as the other with the proper words to denote every portion or fragment of the great congeries of thought.

THERE is reaſon to think, that there are much greater differences among mankind, with reſpect to that capacity or comprehenſiveneſs of mind, by which they take in, or attend to, at once, a variety of objects and relations, than there are with reſpect to the conception or ſimple apprehenſion of any one of them by itſelf. And that comprehenſiveneſs of mind, which is in truth a moſt valuable talent, both with a view to ſpeculation and action, may be improved by various means, eſpecially by frequent exerciſe, and may be aſſiſted by many expedients.

A PERSON who, when he firſt begins the ſtudy of mathematics, can apprehend only the axioms and the ſimpleſt propoſitions, after a few months or years employed in that ſtudy, will eaſily apprehend, not only the propoſition, but the demonſtration of complex theorems, which are maſſes of co-exiſtent thoughts, that could not be expreſſed by the ſucceſſion of words in leſs than ſeveral minutes, nor by the arrangement of words in leſs than ſeveral pages.

THE ſucceſſion, and even the beſt arrangement of words are found ſo unſuitable for the expreſſion of ſuch combinations of thoughts as occur in many mathematical propoſitions, that other expedients are very generally and properly employed to aſſiſt us in making or in communicating theſe complex operations of thought.

DIAGRAMS and algebraical formulæ anſwer theſe purpoſes admirably well. Neither of them, ſtrictly ſpeaking, is eſſential to mathematical demonſtration; but both of them are highly uſeful in it, and many good mathematicians would be at a ſtand if they were deprived of them. A good *conſtruction* or diagram will ſuggeſt inſtantaneouſly the whole congeries of thought which conſtitutes both the propoſition and the demonſtration of a theorem. A good *expreſſion* in algebra anſwers nearly the ſame purpoſe; and ſuggeſts, almoſt inſtantaneouſly, ſuch a maſs of thought, without confuſion, as never could have

have been conveyed by common words in ſucceſſion and arrangement, by reaſon of the great length of time required to utter or to read them; in the courſe of which time, many of the particular thoughts compoſing the maſs would be gone, before others were ſuggeſted or produced, with which they ought to be combined, to enable us to perceive their various relations.

THE analogy between the diagrams and formulæ of mathematicians, and the moods of verbs, and other inflections of words in common diſcourſe, which I endeavour here to point out, is not ſo diſtant as may at firſt ſight appear. They agree in this, that all of them expreſs, infinitely better than any ſucceſſion or arrangement of words can do, combinations of thoughts, which are almoſt or perfectly co-exiſtent, and which, by means of them, are apprehended more juſtly, more quickly, and more forcibly, than otherwiſe they could be.

AND let it be remembered, that the objects and relations which occupy the minds of geometers, though more abſtruſe, and requiring a greater voluntary effort of thought, than thoſe which engage the attention of ordinary men, are not more numerous or complicated, but in general much leſs ſo; and that they admit more eaſily, and with leſs injury, of being broken down, and given ſucceſſively, at leaſt with a view to demonſtration, in which no great quickneſs is required. Hence, in a great meaſure, the clearneſs and force of mathematical reaſoning.

THE maſſes of co-exiſtent thoughts which we often meet with in common diſcourſe, or in elegant compoſition *in full periods*, are of incredible extent, as appears on our endeavouring to analyſe them, and expreſs in detail the various parts of the complicated meaning which we apprehend.

THE firſt ſeven lines of the Iliad, containing about forty words, and the firſt ſixteen lines of Paradiſe Loſt, containing about one hundred and twenty words, denote reſpectively a

maſs

maſs of co-exiſtent thoughts, not a train of ſucceſſive thoughts. The thoughts expreſſed in them are much more numerous than the words, as plainly appears on endeavouring to explain or define all the words, even in their moſt general radical meaning, which is rendered ſtill more complicated, that is, expreſſive of more thoughts, by the inflections of many of them, eſpecially in the Greek lines. We can attend to different parts of that maſs of thought, at our pleaſure, regardleſs of the reſt, or we may take in, more or leſs clearly, the whole at once, as the authors certainly did in compoſing the lines; or we may attend accurately to the meaning of every word ſingly. And if this be done very ſlowly, and with long intervals between every word, the meaning of the whole lines, as a ſentence or period, will be loſt; nor can we, in ſuch a way of reading or pronouncing HOMER's or MILTON's lines, make ſenſe of them, but by a voluntary and painful effort of memory, to retain, or recal, the former words and thoughts, till the latter are ſuggeſted and duly combined with them. The words of the fineſt period that ever was compoſed, when read or uttered one by one at the interval of a few minutes, or even ſeconds, will no more have the effect of the period properly read or uttered, in point of thought, than an equally ſlow ſounding of the various notes in a piece of muſic will have, in point of melody or harmony, the effect of the muſic properly performed; or than the ſucceſſive and ſlow inſpection of the different rainbow colours will have, in giving the perception of white, which they would give, if contemplated at once properly blended, or even if contemplated in very quick ſucceſſion.

AFTER all, perhaps the beſt illuſtration of this important principle is that of the Indian orator, mentioned in the Origin and Progreſs of Language, Vol. IV. p. 22. "I have heard a "ſtory" (ſays the learned author of that work) "of an Indian "orator, who, at a congreſs or *talk*, as they call it, with the "then Britiſh governor of Florida, Commodore JOHNSTON, "being

" being frequently interrupted by the interpreter, who ſtopped " him in order to explain to the governor what he ſaid, at laſt " loſt patience; and, ſays he, *I can bear this no longer. My " diſcourſe, cut thus into pieces, can have no more effect than the " water could have on that great beaſt of yours,* (pointing to a " ſaw-mill at ſome diſtance) *if it were to fall upon it drop by " drop.* Now, this orator muſt have had as perfect an idea " of the *flumen orationis*, and the effects it produces, as a CI- " CERO or DEMOSTHENES." The ſame author has many juſt and ſtriking remarks on the force, the beauty, and the *comprehenſiveneſs* of compoſition in periods, (page 239, 240.) and of inflection of words, (page 14. *et paſſim.*) And all of theſe obſervations may fairly be applied to the moods of verbs. What proper periods are to very great and complicated maſſes of thought, inflections, including moods, are to the more familiar and ſmaller combinations of thoughts, which we almoſt every moment experience, and wiſh to expreſs united as we conceive them.

* * * *

As I think it of eſſential importance, in all ſcientific inveſtigations, never to blend *hypotheſes*, or matters of opinion, with evident matters of fact, and ſtrict inferences by induction from them; it is proper to point out, that no hypotheſis whatever, with reſpect to the original ſtate, or the formation, or the improvement, of language, is aſſumed in this Eſſay.

IT has generally been ſuppoſed, or taken for granted, in all reaſonings about the theory of language, that, in a very early period of its progreſs, perhaps from its very origin, it was rude and ſimple, almoſt deſtitute of inflections, (ſuch as the moods of verbs) and in a great meaſure or wholly monoſyllabic; and that all manner of inflections and modifications, by compoſition, by augment, or otherwiſe, were gradually given, in a ſlow progreſs, to thoſe monoſyllabic roots, by deliberate human contrivance.

THAT

THAT this has taken place, to a certain degree, in many languages, and to a very great degree in ſome, cannot be diſputed. In Greek, for example, we can, with the greateſt eaſe, refer ſome thouſands of *words* (counting every variation by inflection, by augment, or by compoſition, as a different *word*) to one ſimple root, ſuch as λεγ.

IN ſome languages, it ſeems probable that the uſual progreſs and improvement has not taken place, they remaining very long in a monoſyllabic ſtate. This has certainly been the caſe with the Chineſe language, for ſome thouſands of years; probably, in part at leaſt, the conſequence of that great, civilized and ingenious people perſiſting in the uſe of hieroglyphic characters, immediately ſignificant of thought, without any direct relation to audible words, like the Indian figures that we uſe in common arithmetic, and never adopting the noble invention of alphabetic characters, directly expreſſive only of ſounds, the combinations of which ſounds are immediately ſignificant of thought.

BUT ſome ingenious men have been of opinion, confirmed, as it is ſaid, by actual obſervations of the languages of ſome very rude nations, eſpecially in America, that ſome languages at leaſt, perhaps all, were, in a very early period, polyſyllabic to a moſt inconvenient degree; the words of them being very long, and ſignificant of very complicated meanings, like phraſes or whole ſentences of ours. It has been thought, that theſe unwieldy long words may have been gradually broken down into ſhorter, and even into monoſyllables; which, in a further progreſs, might be varied again by inflection and otherwiſe.

IT is certainly conceivable, and not very improbable, that mankind, in their firſt rude attempts towards forming a language, might not perceive the vaſt advantage to be gained by ſubdividing, and breaking down as it were, the great maſs of thought which they conceived, and wiſhed to communicate. They might attempt to give utterance by one word to all the maſs

maſs of thought which they had to expreſs. Thus, *Give me a bow*, might be expreſſed by one word; *Give me food*, by another; *I ſaw a friend, an enemy, a beaſt, a man, a woman*, by as many different words; no diſtinction being made between noun and verb, agent or ſubject, mood or accident. But the inconvenience of ſuch a language would ſoon be felt and gradually remedied; and the firſt and moſt natural ſtep would be to employ the ſame word for *give*, whatever was to be given, one word for *ſee*, whatever was ſeen, and to employ different *nouns* to denote the ſubſtances given or ſeen. But this implies the previous exerciſe of a faculty of a higher order than that of dividing the voice, or forming articulate ſounds. The ſame power that has made us Μερόπες, hath alſo taught us to divide our thoughts. Indeed, without this nobler faculty, which ſeems to be denied to all the inferior animals, and is ſcarce perceptible in man during the firſt months of his life, the other would be of little value. Several animals have learnt to divide the voice, or to articulate, better than many unfortunate individuals of our own ſpecies, who were deficient in the proper organs of voice and ſpeech; but none of them have ever learned to make uſe of ſpeech as we do. They probably always, and children for ſome time, make no attempt to ſeparate or analyſe their thoughts. Till that be done, which our ſuperior faculties ſoon enable us to do, the very fundamental notions of the parts of ſpeech cannot be conceived, grammatical language cannot be contrived, nor even if it were preſented to us ready made, in all the perfection of the Greek of DEMOSTHENES, could it be either learned or employed.

ON the former ſuppoſition, (page 55.) the moods of verbs muſt be conceived to be *added* to them in the courſe of the formation or improvement of language.

ON the latter ſuppoſition, they muſt be conceived to be *retained* in language, and to be a remnant of a very rude polyſyl-

labic ſtate of it, which, though inconvenient on the whole, had ſome advantages.

SOME *expreſſions* occaſionally employed in this Diſſertation, may ſeem to favour or to imply the former ſuppoſition. But that is not meant. Neither hypotheſis is aſſumed in the reaſoning. Thoſe expreſſions have always been employed with caution and diſtruſt, and merely in compliance with cuſtom, a deviation from which might have ſeemed to imply the oppoſite hypotheſis, and would have required a new, and, in ſome meaſure, an embarraſſed and uncouth mode of expreſſion.

BOTH hypotheſes are equally indifferent to this Theory of the Moods of Verbs, which is independent of all hypotheſes, and does not extend to the *hiſtory* of the firſt appearance of *moods*, nor to the queſtion, whether they be added to language in its progreſs, or retained in it when perhaps many other inflections were laid aſide. They may be partly both, or their hiſtory may be different in different languages. All that is attempted in this Theory of the Moods of Verbs, is only to inveſtigate the nature and import of them more accurately than had been done before, and to ſhew what valuable, and almoſt indiſpenſible purpoſes they actually ſerve in the communication of thought.

FINIS.